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The security environment for the United States has
undergone dramatic changes in the last three years. The most
significant change is the decreased threat of the former
Soviet Union. This collapsed threat has subsequently
decreased the amount of dollars available for the Department
of Defense (DOD) 1 . In the past, the U.S. military budget was
based on the following:
The old Soviet threat dominated U.S. military planning.
It determined how big the defense budget was, how U.S.
forces were structured and how U.S. military equipment was
designed. Over half the Cold War defense budget was spent
on defending Europe against the Warsaw Pact threat. The
arms competition with the Soviets drove spending on U.S.
strategic forces. Maintaining U.S. technical superiority
was a response to the massiveness of the Soviet threat.
[Ref. l:p. 3]
Paralleling the decreased Soviet threat is anticipated
reductions in DOD spending. This decreased purchasing will
greatly intensify competitors in the defense industry. The
surviving competitors will be those who improve the quality of
their goods and services while reducing the cost of acquiring
them [Ref. 2:p. 23].
'Abbreviations and acronyms frequently used throughout this
thesis may be found in Appendix A.
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In order to improve the quality of goods and services
procured by Federal Government, the Defense Contract
Management Command (DCMC) has developed a philosophy called
Performance Based Management (PBM). This PBM philosophy
allows the DCMC to objectively measure performance supporting
the appropriate application of scarce resources. Basically
PBM is applying the right people.. .at the right place.. .at the
right time.. .doing the right things. [Ref. 3]
How will PBM decisions be made? From DCMC's point of
view, the declining budget will increase pressure to control
unit costs. As a result, DCMC will depend more and more on
verifiable data from various sources to support their
decisions. [Ref. 3] The different sources that provide input
into PBM decision making are: Contractor Risk Assessment
Guide (CRAG) Program, which provides the Defense Contract
Audit Agency's (DCAA) supporting data; contractor unit cost
data; customer input/feedback; internal reviews (i.e., the
contractor purchasing system review (CPSR)) and special
external reviews which are not controlled by Defense Logistics
Agency (DLA) or DCMC (i.e., attorney actions, Inspector
General evaluations, and General Accounting Office (GAO)
reports). These sources enable the DCMC to make oversight and
resourcing decisions. [Ref. 4]
DCMC's long term strategy is to continually improve the
processes used to deliver quality products and services to
their customers. [Ref. 3] A part of this strategy is a
2
program which enhances the PBM philosophy, encourages
increased communication between Government/industry and
provides a framework for the Government/contractor in
measuring a contractor's key processes. This program is the
Process Oriented Approach to Contract Administration Services
(PROCAS). The PROCAS Program provides information in making
PBM decisions for the Government and assists the contractor
in making decisions by analyzing objective data. DCMC's goals
for PROCAS are: [Refs. 5:p. 1 and 6]
a. Applicable to all DCMC administered contract
activities.
b. A functional orientation to process
orientation.
c. A process to ensure successful completion of
contracts.
d. Founded on professional Government-industry
teamwork.
e. A means to promote consistent treatment of contractors.
f. A method for continuous verifiable improvement.
PROCAS is a voluntary program for defense contractors.
Regardless of contractor involvement, DCMC will apply PROCAS
to all administered contracts. PROCAS is applied in an eight






5. Understanding the Process
6. Selecting thp Nppropriate Metrics
7. Measuring, Analyzing, Managing Information
8. Adjusting Management Emphasis
By sharing data and mutually agreed upon measurement
criteria of contractor key processes, DCMC envisions that
increased Government-industry conmnunication will provide an
environment for making informed decisions regarding continuous
process improvement(s). [Ref. 7]
This thesis will provide the Government and the defense
industry with an analysis/study that objectively evaluates the
PROCAS Program at FMC's Ground Systems Division (GSD). The
end result will be to determine if this voluntary program is
viable for FMC.
B. OBJECTIVE OF RESEARCH
The research objective is to analyze the extent to which
the DCMC's PROCAS Program is impacting FMC's Ground Systems
Division and the Government's Defense Plant Representative
Office (DPRO).
C. SCOPE OF THESIS
This thesis will be a case study. The effort will be
directed to analyzing the PROCAS Program implemented at FMC's
GSD located in San Jose, California. The study will be
augmented by interviews/opinions of key Government/GSD
"4
officials regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of the
PROCAS Program.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Primary Research Question: To what extent is DCMC's
PROCAS Program reducing Government oversight and increasing
Government/contractor communications.
In support of the primary question, the following
subsidiary questions were established:
1. What are the essential elements of the pilot PROCAS
Program and how has the program been implemented thus
far in FMC?
2. To what extent has the PROCAS Program changed the
processes at GSD?
3. To what extent has the PROCAS Program changed the way
the cognizant DPRO reviews GSD's processes?
4. Is measuring the return on investment of PROCAS
beneficial?
5. What conclusions may be drawn from GSD's implementation
of the PROCAS Program which could be used to benefit
other Department of Defense Contractors?
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The primary method of data gathering for this thesis was
on-site visits and interviews with representatives of FMC's
GSD in San Jose, California and the cognizant DPRO.
Additional information was obtained from telephone
interviews and correspondence with officials from DCMC and
Defense Contract Management District West (DCMD-W). Current
5
articles in professional journals and publications provided
key supporting information.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This thesis consists of seven chapters which are outlined
below:
1. Introduction: The introduction provides a brief
orientation of the PROCAS Program, the objective of the
thesis, research questions and an outline of the remainder of
the thesis.
2. Background: This chapter provides historical
background information on the DCMC, the creation of the PROCAS
Program, and specific background on FMC's GSD.
3. PROCAS features: This chapter describes the essential
elements of the PROCAS Program.
4. FMC implementation of the PROCAS Program: This
chapter describes how GSD implemented the PROCAS Program.
5. Effects of GSD's PROCAS participation: This chapter
identifies the processes that GSD is attempting to improve and
how cognizant DPRO officials perceive these process
changes.
6. An analysis of the PROCAS Program's potential
effectiveness: This chapter analyzes the PROCAS Program's
effectiveness in promoting contractor efficiency.
7. Conclusions and Recommendations: This chapter
contains conclusions derived from the research and
6





This chapter will describe how DCMC conceptualized PROCAS
and provide the background of how GSD decided to implement
PROCAS. Prior to discussing the inception of the PROCAS
Program, the CRAG Program must be described. CRAG was the
first attempt between industry and Government to increase
cost-effectiveness.
B. CRAG BACKGROUND
On 15 July 1985, President Reagan signed Executive Order
12526. It appointed a Presidential Blue Ribbon Commission
headed by David Packard (referred to as the Packard
Commission) to examine the Defense Department's overall system
of command, its systems for determining requirements and the
administrative procedures for acquisition and procurement
programs. [Ref. 8:p. 34] In June 1986, the Packard Commission
published its final report. It concluded that contract
violations would be reduced if Government contractors
established more effective internal control systems and the
means to show that these systems were effective. [Ref. 9:p. i]
In response to the Packard Commission Report, the CRAG Program
was developed jointly by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, the Inspector General, DOD, the Director of the
8
Defense Contract Audit Agency, and the defense industry. [Ref.
9:p. i] The goals of the program were described by the
Secretary of Defense in an October 1988 memorandum to Defense
Agencies and Departments. They are to strengthen contractor
internal controls through self-governance and increase the
efficiency and effectiveness of DOD oversight effort. [Ref.
10:p. 15] Through a series of joint DOD and defense industry
meetings, CRAG was approved by the Government and defense
industry and was published in October 1988. Contractors who
demonstrated that they implemented internal control systems
that met CRAG control objectives could receive less direct
Government oversight. [Ref. 9:p. i] Through the CRAG Program,
the DOD invited industry to assess their internal control
systems on a voluntary basis. [Ref. 10:p. 15]
Having contractors improve their internal control systems
through self-governance sounded like a great idea. However,
the CRAG Program revealed a variety of problems. These
included: industry's inability to see the potential reward
from the program, the CRAG Program would not justify the
additional overhead monies to avoid risk, lack of information
about the program and the chronic mistrust between Government
and industry. [Ref. 11] For example, a 1990 memorandum from
a National Contract Management Association (NCMA) meeting on
CRAG indicated several reasons for industry's reluctance to
participate in the CRAG Program:
9
a. A belief that it would not lead to reduced oversight.
b. There is nothing in CRAG that will change the
fundamental mistrust between DCAA and industry.
c. DCAA field workers won't implement the program fully
since their careers depend on making findings of
noncompliance.
d. The benefits don't outweigh the implementation costs,
since more overhead will be required in the way of
additional internal auditors. [Ref. 121
The CRAG Program was officially approved by the Secretary
of Defense on 29 November 1988. However, many members of the
defense industry saw no significant changes. [Ref. 13:p. 9]
A senior defense industry executive described the relationship
between the Government and the defense industry in May 1990:
I have never seen the defense industry the way it is
right now. Morale is low, companies are losing hundreds
of millions of dollars and there is widespread anxiety
about the Defense budget. We are thrust together in a
relationship that requires contractors, the Defense
Department and Congress to work together. But instead, we
operate in an environment of suspicion, fear, and even
some danger. [Ref. 13:p. 52]
Contractors today perceive these same problems.
Therefore, they are hesitant to participate in any voluntary
program that does not guarantee a reduction in Government
oversight or an increase in profits via cost reduction. [Ref.
141
C. THE DCXC STRUCTURE
In June 1989, Secretary of Defense Cheney submitted a
Defense Management Report (DMR) to President Bush that
10
recommended improvements to the Defense acquisition process.
[Ref. 15:p. 28] One of the improvements Secretary Cheney
recommended was consolidating all contract administration
functions performed in DLA and the various military
departments. The purpose of this consolidation was outlined
by Mr. Cheney:
The consolidation management of contract administration
will provide uniform procurement policy, permit the
upgrading in the quality of the CAS work force, reduce
overhead and payroll costs. The consolidated management
also permitted the CAS structure to be streamlined from
nine regions into five districts. [Ref. 15:p. 311
On 26 February 1990, DCMC was formed and charged with DOD-
wide contract management support, engineering and program
support, quality assurance, and contractor payment activity.
(Ref. 16:p. 251 A simplified organizational chart in Figure
1 shows where DCMC fits within DOD.
DCMC's mission is to administer Defense Contracts for the
military services, other Department of Defense Components,
Federal Civil Agencies and, when authorized, to Foreign
Governments. DCMC's mission elements are: [Ref. 13:p. 19]
a. To assure contractor compliance with cost, delivery,
technical, quality, and other terms of the contract.
b. To accept products on behalf of the Government.
c. To pay the contractor.
d. To provide program support.
Figure 2 depicts that DCMC is broken down into 5 districts
within the United States and one district for international
11
contracts. These designated districts areas are: West,
South, Mid-Atlantic, Northeast, and North Central. When the
DCMC deems that a significant level of oversight is necessary,
DPRO acts as the on-site eyes and ears at the contractor's
place of performance. For smaller contracts that require less
oversight, a Defense Contract Management Area Operations
(DCMAO) office provides oversight for several contracts within
a designated area. Regardless of size, the cognizant DPRO or
DCMAO is responsible for the contract administration function
of an assigned contract. These contract administrative
functions are outlined in the Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR), part 42, subpart 42.302 as depicted in Appendix B.
Due to the number of contracts and the value of these
contracts, the DCMC has determined that a DPRO would be co-
located with FMC's GSD in San Jose, California. Figure 3
shows the structure for the DPRO located at FMC's Ground
Systems Division.
D. THE PROCAS BEGINNING
Having responsibility for all DOD-wide contracts enabled
the DCMC to develop PROCAS by combining the best practices and
procedures from the Defense Logistics Agency's Defense
Contract Administration Services (DCAS) and military service
plant representatives. The initial elements of PROCAS were












Figure 1. Overview of the DCMC within the Department of
Defense





Figure 2. Simplified Organizational Chart of DCMC




Figure 3. Simplified Organizational Chart of the Defense Plant
Representative Office
Source: DPRO located at FMC.
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Quality Evaluation (IQUE) and the best of the military
Services' quality self-governance programs. [Ref. 4]
The catalyst for PROCAS was to seek continuous improvement
of Government oversight and successful contract completion.
Seven corporations participated in testing and developing the
initial PROCAS concepts. The corporations that participated
in the pilot program were: TRW, Hughes, FMC, Northrop,
Rockwell, Martin Marietta and Magnavox. The DCMC's intent in
having these corporations participate was to provide a cross
section within the Defense Industry (i.e., airframe,
electronic, software, missile, and armored vehicle). [Ref. 3)
Chapter III will discuss the components of PROCAS.
As indicated by Mr. Robert P. Scott, Executive Director of
Contract Management at DCMC, PROCAS would be implemented at
all contract administration offices (CAO). Implementation of
PROCAS is defined as occurring when: A District PROCAS
implementation plan has been developed, teaming agreements are
in place at all DPROs and at selected contractors at all DCMAO
offices, and team planning is compete or underway at all DPROs
where teaming agreements were made. [Ref. 6] Navy Admiral
Straw, Director, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) discussed
further cost savings potential for both the Government and
defense contractors through PROCAS in a brief to General
Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Specific cost
savings include: reduced scrap rates, better subcontractor
16
prices/quality, overhead control and reduced work-in-process
inventories. [Ref. 3]
As the elements of the PROCAS program are spread
throughout the DCMC's five districts, contractors are ready to
implement the PROCAS Program in the immediate future. PROCAS
is viewed as a way to improve their processes, reduce their
costs and increase profits. [Ref. 3]
E. FMC - GROUND DIVISION INFORMATION
FMC is a diversified corporation involved in the following
areas: agricultural/industrial chemicals, defense systems,
machining and equipment, and precious metals. Figure 4 shows
a simplified structure of FMC.
Within the Defense System Group, the Ground Systems
Division in San Jose, California is the only FMC group that
has implemented PROCAS concepts into daily operations. Figure
5 depicts where the Ground Systems Division fits within the
Defense System Group.
The principal business operations for GSD are tracked
military vehicles for the United States Army and allied
governments. [Ref. 17:p. 11) Currently the major programs
within GSD are: the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV), the
multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) and the armored gun
system (AGS). [Ref. 11)






Figure 4. Simplified Organizational Chart of the FMC
Corporation




Figure 5. Simplified Organizational Chart of the FMC's Defense
Systems Group Headquarters
Source: Current FMC Organizational Structure dated January
1985.
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Program Number of contracts Dollar Value
(in production)
BFVS & MLRS 30 6.7 Billion
AGS 1 .8 Billion
Misc-Includes R & D 131 .8 Billion
Total 162 8.3 Billion
Source: DPRO's management information report.
F. THE GROUND DIVISION'S PROCAS EVOLUTION
In 1989, FMC forecasted the Department of Defense's
downsizing. This forecast was not merely done in a crystal
ball. Rather, the downfall of the Berlin Wall, the
unsuccessful coup attempt against Gorbachev in the Soviet
Union and the peace dividend savings discussions within
Congress made FMC acutely aware of significant reductions in
future defense contracts. Foreseeing this change within DOD
via Congress, FMC began emphasizing Total Quality Management
(TQM). Through TQM, FMC changed their focus to the ultimate
customer of the product ... the soldier in the field. This
change of focus made FMC become more concerned with quality.
Moreover, FMC realized that producing higher quality items at
no additional cost would help them compete for future
contracts. [Ref. 181
Since implementing TQM in 1989, GSD has continued to
improve the quality of their products. GSD's TQM efforts
20
eased the transition of folding the PROCAS Program into their
business philosophy. [Ref. 191 The results of GSD
implementing PROCAS are discussed in Chapter V.
G. SUMKARY
CRAG provided defense contractors che voluntary
opportunity to improve their contract performance, reduce and
improve Government oversight, and most importantly enhance
Government/industry relations via improved communications.
Unfortunately, contractors could not see cost savings with
CRAG nor did they believe there would be less Government
oversight. However, with PROCAS, defense contractors are
anxious to team with the Government in identifying cost saving
steps to improve their profits. By reducing costs, defense
contractors can see themselves making money while remaining
price competitive.
21
III. PROCAS PROGRAM ESSENTIAL FEATURES
A. INTRODUCTION
One of the major concerns identified by the Packard
Commission was the need for improved oversight of defense
contractors. [Ref. 13:p. 17] To improve oversight, the DCMC
established the Performance Based Management philosophy as
discussed in Chapter I. The need for improved oversight has
always been a priority for the DCMC. This was reflected by
Major General Henry, the previous Commander of the DCMC, on 29
June 1992 when discussing the importance of Performance Based
Management:
PBM is the Defense Contract Management Command
management philosophy that links contractor performance
with the appropriate level of CAS... to determine risk and
make decisions on how many CAS people are required. [Ref.
20]
Driven by budget constraints, Congress' oversight and
customer expectations, the DCMC's vision is to continuously
improve its contract management and support its strategy of
improving the processes used to deliver quality products and
services to its customers. To support DCMC's vision and
strategy, PROCAS was developed to encourage increased
communication between Government and industry and to directly
measure key contractor processes. [Ref. 5:p. 1]
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Data sharing between the Government and the contractor
forms the framework for mutually agreeing upon criteria for
measuring improvements in a contractor's process. [Refs. 3 and
5:p. 1] Therefore, PROCAS provides the information/data and
the visibility for the Government and the contractor to make
informed decisions. This chapter will discuss elements of the
PROCAS program and how DCMC envisions implementing the
program.
B. PROCAS ELIKENTS
Prior to discussing the PROCAS structure, the key elements
of PROCAS must be understood. The key elements are: tasks,
processes and systems. The following definition of these
elements is provided:
Tasks are actions taken by an individual such as filling
out a form, cutting a piece of material, etc.
Processes are a series of tasks leading to a common
objective and satisfying a requirement, such as producing an
estimate, making a handle, etc.
Sysgtems (sometimes called process families) are a natural
grouping of related processes and controls that lead to larger
objective, such as the telephone system, a flight control
system, or the estimating system. [Ref. 5:p. 2]
Understanding these key elements provides an insight into
how one process can compliment another, or be the result of
another. Figure 6 shows the interrelationship between
23
complimentary and supporting processes. The generic
enterprise core areas necessary to satisfy contract
requirements are:
a. Business Plannina and Control includes the processes
used to manage normal business activities and provides
supporting business management services to the
enterprise.
b. Program Planning and Control includes the processes used
to manage and control program cost, schedule,
performance *and technical changes. This area also
includes the processes used to integrate issues to
determine program and/or contract impact.
c. Product Definition and Desian includes the processes
used to transform customer requirements into a
producible design and to support, as needed, new
production processes.
d. Product Delivery includes the processes used to plan,
schedule, fabricate, assemble, test, deliver and accept
contract end items. These processes convert the product
design into deliverable end items accepted by the
Government.
e. Product SuDDort includes the processes used to ensure
customer satisfaction after product delivery. These
processes provide post-delivery products and services to
support the end item after delivery to the user. [Ref.
5:p. 3]
Moreover, grouping processes within the above areas
enables the Governme.,t and the contractor to select the
functions that will benefit a particular contract area.
Figure 7 depicts the processes that may be associated with a
system/area. Understanding the various processes within a
group is another way of assisting the Government and the
contractor in determining which processes are complementary,
which are supporting and which are intersecting. [Ref. 5:p. 3]
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By analyzing the processes, DCMC has shifted from fixing the
defect to improving the process. [Ref 21:p. 6] This is
depicted in Figure 8.
C. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Prior to discussing the steps involved with PROCAS, it is
important to delineate the roles and responsibilities. In the
following paragraphs contract administration services (CAS)
refers to either a DPRO's or a DCMAO's CAS responsibilities.
[Ref. 5:p. 4)
a. Contractors are responsible for complying with all
contract terms and conditions, notwithstanding plans and
efforts directed toward improved performance.
b. Headquarters DCMC is responsible for overall PROCAS
policy and outside agency executive level contract.
c. Commanders at all levels within DOMC are responsible for
implementing PROCAS command wide. The command roles are
important because of the cross functional teaming
approach that PROCAS encompasses.
d. DCMD Commanders will ensure:
1. Effective planning is accomplished at all levels for
PROCAS implementation.
2. Personnel receive the training, tools, and other
support to effectively implement PROCAS.
3. CAO Commanders encourage and facilitate teaming of
personnel in facilities where there is cross-
functional involvement.
4. CAO Commanders coordinate implementation strategies
to ensure consistent implementation, with special
emphasis on contractor corporate operations which
cross DCMD area boundaries.
5. Contractors, customers, and DCAA personnel are
adequately informed about PROCAS and encouraged to
25
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e. CAO Commanders will ensure:
1. Personnel are adequately trained for PROCAS
implementation.
2. Teaming is encouraged and carried out to the
greatest extent possible among CAO personnel.
3. Contractors, customers, and DCAA personnel are
adequately informed about PROCAS, and encouraged to
actively participate.
4. Management attention and resources are adjusted
based upon demonstrated and measurable contractor
performance.
5. A plan is developed and maintained to establish the
overall CAO strategy for implementing PROCAS.
f. The Government Process Specialist will:
1. Represent the Government, and therefore, will
perform independent surveillance as required to
protect its interest.
2. Validate data independently as required.
3. Work with the PROCAS team to identify process
improvements.
4. Team with other affected Government specialists.
5. Ensure timely and effective corrective action of
noncompliance problems by the contractor.
The roles and responsibilities will become clearer upon review
of the PROCAS process.
D. THE PROA PROCESS
The PROCAS process, as mentioned earlier (refer to Figure
8), emphasizes prevention and improvement rather than the
29
traditional approach of detecting a problem, fixing it but
never understanding why the problem existed. The PROCAS
processes emphasize statistical process control, process
analysis and data collection to monitor progress and make
continuous improvements. Figure 9 identifies the eight-step
processes that provide flexibility to allow tailoring across
commodity lines, management systems and industry cultures.
[Ref. 21:p. 6]
PROCAS's eight steps are discussed below:
1. Government Planning is the first step. DCMC personnel
determine which contractors to approach in implementing
PROCAS. All major contractors that have a co-located DPRO
will be approached by the DPRO. The DCMAO will prioritize
PROCAS involvement of smaller contractors based upon such
factors as input from customer(s), criticality of the
contractors' product, how widespread the products are used
among weapon systems and/or in the DOD community, and the
magnitude of the improvement opportunity. (Ref. 21:p. 81
2. Teaming agreement occurs when the Government (DPRO or
DCMAO) approaches the contractors that have been identified
from step I and discusses a teaming agreement. The teaming
agreement will involve the contractor, the customer, the
Government and other agencies for example the Defense Contract
Audit Agency (DCAA).
However, the DCAA is limited in their ability to
participate with the teaming. (Ref. 21:p. 8] During Process
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Action Team (PAT) participation, DCAA auditors may serve as
advisory members of contractor PATs and any Government PATs
which focus on contractor systems of internal controls.
Auditor participation in teaming is outlined below:
DCAA's role as independent financial advisor to the
contracting officer precludes our being voting
participants in final contractor management decisions.
However, auditors should support PAT activities
enhancements. They should also identify any past issues
which the PAT needs to consider or any prospective issues
which should be evaluated. For each PAT, the field audit
office manager should communicate in writing the role of
DCAA, that this role is required by professional standards
and the fact that DCAA will continue to provide an
independent audit opinion based on representative tests of
internal control systems. DCAA auditors may be fully
participating team members of Government PATs which focus
on implementation of Government regulations or oversight
processes. However, DCAA auditors should normally not be
members of advisory boards or steering committees related
to contractor systems or operations. [Ref. 221
The teaming agreement can be either formal with a written,
signed document or informal with a handshake sufficing.
However, these agreements will not be legally binding for the
Government or provide an avenue for the contractor to deviate
from or modify the terms and conditions of the contract. [Ref.
21:p. 81
An important aspect of this step is that the team will use
a common data base to jointly identify processes and establish
measures. The impetuous of the agreement is to allow the
Government and industry to jointly emphasize teamwork and
continuous improvement. However, if a contractor decides not
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to participate in a teaming agreement, the DPRO or DCMAO may
proceed unilaterally with the PROCAS Program. [Ref. 21:p. 8]
3. Team planning is the third step and is the h-e-y to
successfully implementing PROCAS. Planning starts with clear,
understandable objectives. Moreover, these clear objectives
are supported by a master plan/schedule that: identifies and
schedules training needs and activities, identifies contractor
processes, identifies contractor process owners, identifies
Government process specialists, prioritizes processes, defines
and understands processes, develops process measures and
performance goals, selects methods for tracking process
improvements and corrective actions, selects methods of
process assessment and selects a common database to
measure/manage. [Refs. 5:p. 6 and 20:p. 8]
4. Process selection starts by selecting processes
critical to satisfying the contractual requirements. The
number of processes selected will vary from contractor to
contractor. Criteria for prioritizing and selecting processes
for analysis may include: criticality of the end item, dollar
value of the process, impact if failure occurs, visibility or
interest to the customer or requirement for assessment by
Government regulations. [Ref. 5:p. 6)
5. Understanding the process allows the maximum
flexibility and identifies process ownership. In this step,
the team analyzes the process(es). The team will also
determine: the process objective; the internal or external
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customers or suppliers; the process flow; the contract and
process requirements. [Ref. 2 1:p. 8]
To assist in understanding the processes, the team will
identify the sequence of tasks and review the relationship of
each task. For complex processes and products, the team may
elect to prepare process flow chart(s). The appropriate tools
to analyze a process must be established and understood at the
local level. [Ref. 5:p. 7]
6. Selecting appropriate metrics can only be accomplished
if a process is understood. Upon understanding the process,
the PROCAS team can define objective measures of the
process (es). For agreement on objective measures, it is
essential that process measures be a joint venture between the
Government and the contractor. The measures include
repetitive measures of performance to gauge efficiency and
effectiveness and periodic measures to gauge whether processes
are stable, mature and predictable. [Ref. 21:p. 9]
The PROCAS team works together to identify a minimum level
of performance based on contract requirements. Moreover, the
contractor is encouraged to establish goals that require
innovation and exceptional effort. As process performance
becomes more consistent, stable and predictable, the process
becomes what is labeled as "sophisticated". This
sophistication enables DCMC to predict future process
performance. The ability to predict future performance
34
provides DCMC with the ability to predict risks associated
with a process. (Refs. 5:p. 7 and 21:p. 9]
7. Measure, analyze and manage provides the PROCAS team
data and analysis to manage and improve processes by taking
prompt and appropriate action. The Government and the
contractor are concerned with detecting and preventing
deficiencies that are identified through statistical analysis.
This provides opportunities for improving process performance.
(Ref. 21:p. 9]
Confidence in data accuracy must be established. Without
accuracy, the data that are recorded, collected and
statistically analyzed will invite the PROCAS team to make
inappropriate action decisions. To determine if a process has
attained the sophisticated status, process data will be
analyzed at established intervals to assess process stability,
trends, or the likelihood of a continuous improvement
opportunity (CIO). [Ref. 5:p. 10]
CIOs are simply a way a PROCAS team member identifies an
opportunity for improvement. It may be written or verbal.
Actions taken in response to a CIO are optional. DPRO/DCMAO
personnel should avoid directing or telling a contractor how
to change a process in order to improve it. If the CAO tells
a contractor to make a change, the CAO has in fact made a
constructive change to the contract for which the Government
is liable.
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Another way of managing process improvements/corrections
is through submitting corrective action requests (CAR). CARs
are submitted to the contractor by the CAO when contractor
noncompliance is noted. There are four levels of CARs.
Depending upon the severity of the noncompliance, they may be
either verbal or written. [Ref. 5:p. 10]
8. Adjust management emphasis is the last step. In this
step, the PROCAS team adjusts its oversight as required,
decreasing oversight of processes that demonstrate a high
level of sophistication. As sophistication increases, the
Government will rely more on the contractor's process control
data, only sampling outputs to verify the control data.
Dependent on the level of sophistication, the DPRO/DCMAO will
adjust its oversight and audit frequency. [Ref. 21:p. 9]
When processes fall below the sophistication level,
contractor management and the Government will become more
involved. This two party involvement will result in process
improvement teams to correct the problem area(s). Until a
contractor meets performance requirements, the Government will
increase surveillance, including direct inspection of the
product. [Ref. 21:p. 9]
E. SUMMARY
Through continuous process improvement, it is clear that
DCMC's PROCAS Program is a viable option for defense
contractors to improve their quality while simultaneously
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lowering their costs. Understanding the roles and
responsibilities of the contractor and the Government enables
them both to be more responsive to the ultimate customer... the
sailor, soldier, airmen, or Marine. However, continuous
process improvement can not be attained without two-way
communications between the Government and the contractor.
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IV. FMC' S IMPLDIENTATION OF THE PROCAS PROGRAM
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will provide background information on FMC's
Ground Systems Division (GSD) prior to implementing the PROCAS
Program. This will be followed by an overview of how GSD has
incorporated PROCAS in daily operations.
B. GROUND SYSTEMS DIVISION PRIOR TO PROCAS
As discussed in Chapter II, in 1989 GSD embarked on a new
philosophy called Total Quality Management (TQM). The
definition and objectives of TQM are:
TQM is defined as a holistic system of organization
management which involves all employees in a process of
continuously improving the organizations' ability to
accomplish its mission. Through this definition, TQM
objectives are summarized as meeting customer requirements
each time, every time by continuously improving all
processes and eliminating all forms of waste through
elimination of root causes of all errors. [Ref. 23:p. 121
Moreover, the TQM philosophy provided GSD with the necessary
tools to a develop a "Total Quality Vision." The vision
developed for GSD became:
Be the United States Armed Forces' most valued supplier
of systems, subsystems, and services for the ground
vehicle market. This will be accomplished by:
a. Understanding the market place and helping the
customer shape the future.
b. Providing superior value.
c. Making FMC.a great place to work.
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d. Having successful financial performance through
excellent execution. (Ref. 24]
To realize this vision, GSD developed the following
management principles and applied them in daily operations:
1. Combining teamwork, technology and tools to do work
right the first time.
2. Continuously improving processes to eliminate waste.
3. Achieving consistent quality through prevention, not
correction.
4. Establishing meaningful measure criteria.
5. Meeting customer requirements.
6. Recognizing quality performance. [Ref. 24]
GSD's TQM philosophy was not implemented overnight; rather
it evolved through a lengthy educational process from the top
down, involving all employees.
Early in 1991, the DPRO Commander, Lieutenant Colonel
Blair Peterson, United States Army and Tom Rabaut, the
Director of Operations at GSD, shared a vision that
incorporated both the Government and the contractor working
together for continuous improvement. This vision became
reality when a joint process improvement effort was developed
that emphasized improvement in manufacturing processes. [Ref.
18]
In April 1991, the DCMC via the Western District (DCMD-W)
approached GSD to implement a pilot program called Performance
Based Management (PBM). The proposed offer was accepted by
GSD. DCMC's PBM pilot program did not have a framework. The
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Government (DPRO) and the contractor (GSD) were to jointly
establish a continuous measurement approach. By implementing
the pilot program, GSD expanded their initial joint process
improvement program from the manufacturing system to other
systems, to include quality management, engineering
management, and others as depicted in Figure 10. [Ref. 18)
Early in 1992, GSD and the other contractors involved in
the PBM pilot program met with DCMC. The major discussion was
twofold: (1) controlling and analyzing processes to make
continuous improvements, and (2) the importance of teaming
between the Government and the contractor. Towards the end of
1992, the best elements of the pilot program were pooled into
the current PROCAS structure. [Ref. 18]
As a result of GSD's prodigious TQM efforts prior to
implementing the PBM pilot program, there were no significant
changes for GSD. LtCol Peterson's and Mr. Rabaut's vision
established what the pilot program was striving to develop:
continuous process improvement via Government and defense
contractor teaming. GSD's vision coupled with their TQM
philosophy enabled them to easily implement DCMC's PROCAS
Program. (Ref. 18]
The next sections will provide an overview of GSD's key
players involved in implementing PROCAS. What DCMC calls
PROCAS, GSD refers to as Performance Based Management (PBM).
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Figure 10. GSD's Systems
Source: GSD's Director of Total Quality.
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C. IMPLEKMNTING PBM IN GROUND SYSTUIS DIVISION
To achieve the goals of implementing PBM into daily
operations, GSD developed a mission statement and clear
objectives. The mission statement and objectives are as
important today as they were two years ago. They are: [Ref.
25]
1. Mission Statement: Develop and implement a performance
based management plan through the identification of
critical processes so that continuous improvement can be
achieved.
2. Objectives:
a. Develop and achieve measurable continuous
improvement process objectives containing measures
of cost, quality, customer, schedule, leadership and
human resources. These measures will be reflected
in everyone's major responsibility areas (MRA).
b. Identify the performance of critical processes and
subprocesses.
c. Identify improvement opportunities and take
appropriate actions.
d. Improve support to internal and external customers.
e. Build a stronger, working relationship between FMC
and the DPRO.
As a by-product of TQM training, GSD created various
teams/committees and identified key personnel to provide
important information/decisions in implementing PBM.
The responsibilities of the teams, committees, and key
individuals are delineated below: [Refs. 24 and 25]
1. Executive Steering Committee: The Executive Steering
Committee includes the Director of each functional
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unit/system in GSD. Their responsibilities are to:
provide a vision of the future, be champions of Total
Quality, and set a clear Total Quality strategy for the
organization.
2. Quality Council: The Quality Council is composed of key
individuals at GSD who address quality improvement
objectives in manufacturing, engineering, and services.
They ensure all the conditions of TQM are being planned
and acted upon. The responsibilities of the council
are:
a. Provide an infrastructure that will allow GSD to
approach Total Quality from a divisional perspective
by providing: direction, consistency of purpose,
common language and implementation of strategy.
b. Act as a vehicle for two-way communication between
the Executive Steering Committee/Quality Council and
the rest of GSD organization.
3. Director of. Total Quality: The Director of Total
Quality leads the Total Quality Process for the GSD.
His/her responsibilities are: provide the Quality
Council with leadership and direction; oversee the PBM
education process in the division; track and measure
overall progress toward PBM; provide and track
organizational milestone for PBM; and establish quality
recognition programs.
4. Guidance Teams: Guidance Teams are composed of three to
six key individuals from each PBM system and the DPRO.
These members have diverse skills, sufficient authority
and a stake in the process improvement efforts. The
members are also familiar with process improvement. The
team's responsibilities are:
a. Provide training and guidance to Champions and
Project Action Teams (PAT) on Performance Based
Management and especially guidance how to identify
processes and subprocesses.
b. Monitor and assess the success of the PBM processes
and subprocesses.
c. Determine needed resources (i.e., people or time).
d. Assist in the selection of team leaders, champions,
and quality advisors.
e. Assist in the selection of project action teams.
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f. Meet regularly with teams and champions.
g. Provide an environment to develop and improve the
system that allows team members to bring about
change.
5. Cbm ion: A Champion is an individual who is
knowledgeable in the process to be improved. His/her
responsibilities are-
a. Set goals and refer the project to a team if
necessary.
b. Monitor, measure and collect data.
c. Report progress to the guidance team.
6. Project Action Team (PAT): The PAT consists of
individuals from GSD, and the DPRO where appropriate,
who are knowledgeable and involved employees/Government
representatives. They meet regularly to work on a
particular project process improvement (s). The
responsibilities of the team are:
a. Address the issue or problem to achieve realistic
goals which are established to ensure the chance of
success.
b. Identify critical processes and subprocesses.
c. Develop a plan for process improvement.
d. Identify customer needs and concerns.
e. Collect meaningful data.
f. Develop the process flowchart.
g. Develop appropriate solutions by attacking the root
causes of problems.
h. Monitor the solution to the problem.
i. Evaluate the process or subprocess.
7. Team Leader (PAT): The PAT Team Leader is an individual
who runs the team, arranges logistical details, and
facilitates meetings. He/she is knowledgeable in the
process to be improved. His/her responsibilities are:
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a. Set goal(s) and refer project to a team if
necessary.
b. Monitor, measure and collect data.
c. Serve as the contact point for communication between
the team and the rest of the organization.
d. Encourage full participation of team members.
e. Conduct meetings and coordinate activities.
8. Quality Advisor (PAT): The Quality Advisor is a person
trained in the scientific approach and in working with
groups. He/she keeps the team on track. His/her
responsibilities are:
a. Help facilitate the team's work, but do not
participate directly in the team's activities.
b. Instruct the team in scientific tools.
c. Lead the team members in problem solving activities.
d. Present the corrective action plan developed by the
PAT to the Guidance Council.
By establishing the above teams, leaders and key
individuals, GSD extended continuous improvement within the
division.
D. THE EVOLUTION OF PBX
The Executive Steering Committee and Director of Total
Quality were instrumental in implementing PBM. Because of the
direction and support of the Executive Steering Committee, the
Director of Total Quality has been able to achieve tremendous
success in creating an infrastructure that meets the mission
statement and objectives of PBM. Moreover, the preponderance
of success in implementing PBM is attributed to the Director
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of Total Quality's continuous education efforts. Educating
the GSD organization in the PBM system combined with GSD's TQM
Vision, has enhanced the commitment to excellence. [Ref. 181
With the PBM infrastructure in place, Guidance Teams are
now -•_ & for implementing and providing oversight for
the PBM system. The composition and qualifications of the
Guidance Team members has not changed, however team members
now have authority to make recommended changes in the process
under review. The Guidance Team's charter is: [Refs. 18 and
25]
a. Breakdown functional barriers.
b. Provide a link between FMC/DPRO and process improvements
efforts.
c. Provide decision and resource support.
d. Identify project goals.
e. Provide guidance for PATs.
f. Implement changes PAT teams are not authorized to make.
g. Select Team Leaders, Champions, and Quality Advisors.
h. Meet regularly with teams/champions.
i. Host monthly reviews.
j. Maintain listing of PATs.
k. Insure changes made by Teams are followed up.
1. Provide recognition for meeting/exceeding PBM
objectives.
A Guidance Team can be formed for many reasons. The team
must strive to quantify the extent of a problem to determine
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the degree to which the process can be improved. The
following are examples why a process may be selected as
critical: (Ref. 25)
a. High level managers complain about a process.
b. The process received a poor rating in an e-ternal audit
(i.e., the DPRO's quality assurance audit).
c. The business has changed and the process is out-of-date.
d. Adequate measurements are not in place.







Figure 11 illustrates the PBM process improvement plan.
When output becomes desirable, the accompanying process is
then accepted (graduated). As shown, there are two paths for
process improvement, with or without PAT involvement. If the
PAT route is taken, GSD has four simple rules...Plan (P), Do
(D), Check (C), and Act (A). These rules provide the steps a
PAT must perform before a process improvement can be accepted.
The other route for process improvement is through an assigned
Champion. The assigned Champion, as discussed earlier,
monitors and measures data against established goals. When
data become desirable, the process is accepted. [Ref. 18)
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In order to track critical processes within a key system,
the Guidance Team measures the success of a system. The PBM
system is measured on a 10 point index scale. The criteria
used for the index scale are outlined in the six steps below:
[Refs. 24 and 25]
1. The first step is to determine if a process is defined.
A process is defined by a process identification
worksheet. It is essential to determine the following
information:
a. Determine, if there is joint FMC/DPRO interest in the
process. GSD will proceed with the work sheet even
if there is no DPRO interest.
b. Identify the system that contains the critical
process to be evaluated (i.e., Quality Management).
c. Identify the key performance measurement that will
be used (i.e., cost, scheduling, or quality).
d. Identify the members of the PAT that will be
evaluating the process.
e. Submit the process's name to be evaluated (i.e.,
Cost of Quality).
f. Describe the process.
g. Rationalize why the process is critical.
h. Identify symptoms of the problem(s) that justifies a
process review.
If the process can be defined, a point is assigned.
2. The second step is to determine if the process can be
mapped. At a minimum, a flow diagram must be completed
showing all major steps of the process. If the process
can be adequately mapped, a point is assigned.
3. The third step is to identify the key performance
measure(s). A measurement must establish a quantifiable
method of representing the status of a process. If a
measurement is established, a point is assigned.
48
: I ' T, fiE1









_ J , .
Figure 11. Process Improvement Plan
Source: GSD's Director of Total Quality.
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4. The fourth step is to determine what goals have been
established. If process improvement expectations have
been established and scheduled over a specific period of
time, a point is assigned.
5. The fifth step is to determine if an improvement plan
has been completed. The improvement plan will entail
the course of action to be taken to improve the process
based on previous goals and measurements. If a
improvement plan is completed, a point is assigned.
6. The sixth step is to evaluate progress of the process
against an established goal (s). To measure the progress
toward a goal, it must be graphically represented by
either a line chart, pie chart, bar graph or a matrix
table. Data representations should include at a minimum
the goal, name of a process, unit of measurement,
frequency of measurements and progress. However, steps
one through five must be completed prior to evaluating
the process and assigning points. Point award for step
six ranges from one to five points.
Figure 12 provides a review of the discussed process
development criteria.
Once a process accumulates eight to ten points, the
process is determined acceptable. However, process acceptance
does not reduce Guidance Team oversight. If a process is
unacceptable, the PAT continues to review the process for
improvement. All critical processes are tracked. During each
quarter the Team Leaders of a PAT or Champions submit their
process index(es) to the respective Guidance Team. In turn,
the Guidance Team(S) consolidate system's performance(s) and
submit the information to the Director of Total Quality.
After review, the Director of Total Quality publishes and
distributes this information throughout the division for
information or action. [Ref. 18]
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Process Development Criteria
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Figure 12. Process Development Criteria
Source: GSD's Director of Total Quality.
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E. SUMMARY
Figure 13 depicts GSD's method of doing "business". It
parallels the eight steps discussed in PROCAS. Additionally,
GSD's TQM philosophy coupled with its PBM system has provided
the working tools necessary to determine if a critical process
is effective, efficient, under control and adaptable. As a
result of focusing on key processes and subprocesses, GSD has
been able to automatically institute a quality improvement
cycle.
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Figure 13. GSD's PBM Compared to PROCAS
Source: GSD's Director of Total Quality.
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V. EFFECTS OF PROCAB PARTICIPATION
A. INTRODUCTION
For the past two years, GSD and the DPRO, under the
command of Lieutenant Colonel Donald Yates, United States
Army, have collaborated to establish a joint contractor/
Government approach that would improve the process and reduce
Government oversight. This effort has intensified over the
last year. The success of this joint effort was reinforced by
Lieutenant Colonel Yates' comments to GSD during a formal
signing of a PROCAS teaming agreement on 5 February 1993:
We look at the total processes across the board and work
collectively together to accomplish the job in a more
effective way and lower our oversight, increase your
efficiency, and together produce a better product.
This chapter will identify the processes GSD is attempting
to improve, the results of process improvements, and the
success DPRO officials at FMC attribute to PROCAS.
B. GSD'S SYSTEM IMPROVEMENTS
As discussed in the previous chapter, Guidance Teams are
formed within different systems to improve a process(es).
Later, as a result of different Guidance Teams' inputs, GSD
establishes a PBM Matrix. The matrix identifies the
process(es) within different systems to be measured via one of
the PBM measurement criterion (i.e., cost, quality, schedule,
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customer, leadership, and human resource). While forming the
Guidance Teams, the DPRO reviews/evaluates the intended
process(es) to determine if it warrants Government
participation. The major criteria required for the DPRO to
participate is whether the process is essential for performing
the contract. If it is, the DPRO will contribute the
necessary resources (i.e., time and personnel). [Ref. i1]
DCMC's PBM pilot program and the resulting PROCAS
objectives were compatible with FMC's TQM efforts. As a
result, GSD was able to identify critical processes with
minimal effort. Additionally, FMC's TQM approach expedited
step 4 of PROCAS, Process Selection. Normally this is a time
consuming ordeal for contractor and Government
representatives. (Refs. 18 and 19]
In this case, GSD developed a comprehensive list of
critical processes involving several systems. Lieutenant
Colonel Yates' DPRO team then reviewed these processes and
selected those that would both benefit from a teaming approach
and have a significant impact on a particular program. As a
result of teamwork and true professionalism, PBM Matrix:Stage
I was created as depicted in Figure 14. The shaded areas
represent GSD/DPRO teaming. The PBM Matrix is labeled Stage
1 because GSD and the DPRO feel process improvement(s) is
continuous. Therefore, it is GSD's and the DPRO's intent to
dedicate resources to another PBM Matrix as processes in Stage
1 become stable (mature). The new process matrix has been
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developed and labeled Stage 2. GSD's PBM Matrix: Stage 2 is
seen in Figure 15. [Refs. 11 and 18)
To ensure continuous effort in process improvements, a new
stage will be developed jointly and overlap a current stage.
[Ref. 181 For example the PBM Matrix:Stage 2 was developed
and revealed in the middle of 1993. Stage 3 will be developed
and revealed sometime during 1994. Of course GSD and the DPRO
do not have the personnel to simultaneously address processes
identified in Stages 1, 2, and 3. Therefore, GSD and the DPRO
will evaluate and freeze the processes in Stage 1, then
dedicate personnel to other critical processes. An overview
of the number of processes in Stage I and 2 are provided:
GSD GSD/DPRO TOTAL
STAGE . 40 29 69
STAGE 2 49 28 77
TOTAL 89 57 146
Source: A GSD/DPRO brief on 27 September 1993.
Worth noting is the increase of processes involved in
Stage 2. During Stage 1, GSD observed that Guidance Teams
have become more experienced and increasingly confident in
their approach to dealing with process problems. This has
enabled GSD to increase the evaluated processes.
Unfortunately, the DPRO's personnel constraints limit the
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Yates' office personnel have declined approximately 25 percent
over the last 12 months. Regardless of personnel shortages,
Lieutenant Colonel Yates is dedicated to continuing to team
with GSD on those processes determined critical. (Ref. 11]
C. OVERVIEW OF PBM/PROCAB SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT
As discussed in Chapter IV, GSD measures individual
processes on a 10 point index scale. Additionally, the 10
point index scale is broken down into three categories: red,
yellow and green. These categories provide GSD and the DPRO
with a quick reference to prioritize the selected process(es).
The color scheme associated with the 10 point index scale is:
[Ref. 25]
COLOR POINT RANGE
Red 0 to 3
Yellow 4 to 7
Green 8 to 10
Each quarter GSD consolidates the PBM indexes for all
systems. This consolidation provides GSD and the DPRO with an
overview of Stage 1 and 2 processes. Figures 16 and 17 show
first quarter's consolidation for 1993. The value for each
system is derivad by accumulating the total for each process
identified in the PBM Matrix Stage 1 or 2 and then dividing by
the total number of measured processes within each system.
The overall rating is 8.69 for Stage 1 (Figure 16) compared to
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Figure 17. PBM Matrix:Stage 2 Consolidation
Source: GSD's Project Manager of Divisional Total Quality.
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This difference is expected because Stage 1 began in
January 1992, while Stage 2 only started in January 1993.
However, Stage 2 is .6 better at this time than Stage 1 was at
a similar level of maturity. Moreover, Stage 2 has an
additional eight processes to consider. Figure 18 compares
Stage l's evolutionary success to Stage 2.
As indicated in Figure 18, GSD didn't initially expect to
attain an 8 to 10 point overall average for each stage.
Instead GSD and the DPRO realized process improvements take
time when moving from a functional to a process orientation.
[Refs. 11 and 18]
D. MEASUREMENT OF PROCAS SUCCESS
Currently DCMC is reviewing all corporations involved with
PROCAS and asking for their total return on investment. This
information will be used to demonstrate PROCAS's benefits to
the Director of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and key
personnel in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. [Ref. 27]
In GSD's case, an accurate return on investment would be a
challenge. It would be extremely difficult for GSD to
distinguish between PROCAS and TQM initiatives prior to
PROCAS. GSD's TQM initiatives were implemented via
comprehensive employee training, TQM staffing, and through
various systems enhancements. These efforts all facilitate
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However, GSD's TQM efforts and DCMC's PROCAS Program have
had significant results for GSD and the Government:
1. GSD has reduced their Cost of Quality from 8.5% of sales
in 1989 to 4.8% in 1992.
2. Labor hours per vehicle on the BFV have been reduced
from 2,224 to 2,003 hours per vehicle.
3. The learning curve on the first six AGS units is
projected to require 73% less direct labor hours as
compared to the equivalent BFV start up.
4. The time to process Engineering Change Proposal (ECP)
requests has decreased from sixteen months to ten months
on non- complex ECPs. For complex ECPs, the time has
decreased form forty three months to fourteen months.
5. The overall division safety record has improved. The
lost work day injury rate has dropped from 3.86 in 1989
to .36 in 1992. This drop has improved attendance in
the various shops from 94.7% in 1989 to better than 97%
at the end of 1992. [Ref. 19]
The DPRO has seen additional significant results
between January 1990 and July 1993:
1. In contract management, proposal preparation
deficiencies were reduced from 10.4 to 3.2.
2. BFV deficiencies in functional inspections and tests
were reduced from 9.6 to 5.5 per vehicle.
3. BFV deficiencies in the final process inspection were
reduced from 16.1 to 4. An improvement of 75%. [Ref.
26]
Currently Lieutenant Colonel Yates' financial analyst is
attempting to quantify the Government's return on investment
from these successes. This will enable Lieutenant Colonel
Yates' team to quantify the benefits of PROCAS into a
measurable and understandable form. GSD reluctance to
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quantify the results of PROCAS will be addressed later in
Chapter VI.
E. RELATIONSHIP OF THE GOVERNMENT AND GSD
The PROCAS Program's primary objective is to improve
quality and productivity in key processes. As discussed
earlier, structuring processes to improve/increase quality and
productivity generates cost savings. From the DPRO's
perspective, major cost savings at FMC are attributed to the
new atmosphere of communication and cooperation between the
DPRO and GSD across organizational boundaries. [Ref. 11]
Despite the declining defense budget, PROCAS has served as an
effective tool for improving the DPRO's and GSD's
relationship. Hopefully, this cooperative environment will
assist the DPRO and GSD during future contract close-outs.
F. SUMMARY
Since implementing their PBM (PROCAS) objectives and their
TQM efforts, GSD has experienced good relations with the DPRO.
This relationship has enabled GSD to align their PBM
philosophy to DCMC's PROCAS program and implement measurements
focusing on cost, quality and schedule. This relationship has
improved processes and more importantly the organization as a
whole. By improving GSD's total organization, the DPRO will
realize several benefits:
a. Reduced program risk.
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b. Improved ability to ensure contractor compliance with
regulations.
c. Improved ability to assist in correcting identified
problems.
d. Improvements in the overall execution of any program
under its responsibility.
GSD and the DPRO have clearly committed their resources
and efforts to PROCAS. GSD and the DPRO realize success
requires several ingredients. GSD and the DPRO must be
flexible and adaptable. Success requires a great deal of
planning. Education is also important. Process
changes/improvements must be accepted by both management
chains. Finally, teamwork is the essential ingredient for
success.
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VI. ANALYSIS OF PROCAS
A. INTRODUCTION
The Government's procurement process has the following
objective:
To acquire supplies and services of the desired quality,
in a timely manner, at fair and reasonable prices. [Ref.
28:p. 1-3]
With PROCAS, the DCMC is attempting to take the
Government's procurement process one step further. PROCAS
establishes an atmosphere of mutual respect, trust, and
professionalism as the Government and the contractor work
toward common goals. As discussed in Chapter III, PROCAS
enables the Government and the contractor to identify key
contractor processes of joint interest and establish
appropriate metrics to improve the effectiveness and
efficiency of performance on contract requirements. PROCAS
will help ensure that the ultimate customer receives quality
products and services. [Ref. 5:p. 1] This chapter will
analyze the PROCAS Program's effectiveness in promoting
contractor efficiency.
B. GOVERNMENT OPTIMIZATION
Regardless of contract type, fixed-price or cost
reimbursable, the Government's objective is to secure needed
supplies and services from responsible sources at fair and
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reasonable prices resulting in the lowest ultimate overall
cost to the Government. [Ref. 28:p. 2-1] Through PROCAS, DCMC
hopes to lower a contractor's total costs. [Ref. 29] PROCAS
uses analytical techniques to evaluate contractor systems,
processes and tasks. Improvements will translate into lower
costs, thereby lowering a program's life cycle costs. How
processes should be measured is outlined by DCMC below:
Fundamental to PROCAS are clearly defined and
objectively measured levels of performance. The
development of these process measures should be a team
effort between the Government and the contractor. Data
should be recorded as events occur and collected at key
process points to support evaluation of a process. When
a contractor's existing data can be used to support
process analysis that data should be used. It should
provide knowledge that supports proactive efforts to
prevent the production of defects, noncompliance,
performance problems, and customer dissatisfaction. [Ref.
5:p. 41
DCMC's PROCAS Program enables the Government to expand
opportunities for continuous process improvement to reduce a
contract's life cycle costs. However, it remains to be seen
if these cost reductions will translate into contractor
efficiency! Identifying the appropriate process,
understanding the process, selecting the appropriate metrics,
and measuring/analyzing the process are critical steps.
Teamwork in process selection assumes that tradeoffs can be
made between labor, capital, and raw material that will offer
reduced process costs. Moreover, as the Government becomes
increasingly aware of a contractor's processes, this knowledge
may identify cost discrepancies (i.e., cost padding).
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C. MEASURING PROCAS EFFICIENCY
PROCAS emphasizes improving production/manufacturing
processes. Naturally as a contractor's efficiency increases,
production/ manuf actur ing costs are assumed to decrease. This
reduces total costs.
How can the Government measure a contractor's process(es)
improvements with PROCAS? The Cobb-Douglas production model,
Q = ALVK'W, could be used to formulate production functions.
In this model, Q is the quantity produced, L is the amount of
labor, K is the amount of capital, M is the amount of raw
materials, and A, a, b, and c are parameters to be estimated.
[Refs. 30:p. 72 and 31:p. 373] Taking the partial derivatives
with respect to L, K, and M, provides the marginal product of
each resource. The marginal product shows how output expands
as the quantity of one input increases, holding~ other inputs
at a constant level. Once derived, the marginal products can
be used in conjunction with input prices to determine the most
efficient mix of resources for a particular process. (Refs.
30:p. 73 and 31:p. 293) Unfortunately, the production model
only demonstrates the various combinations of inputs necessary
for the contractor to produce a given output. Not knowing a
contractor's costs, the Government can't determine whether the
contractor is operating efficiently.
What prevents the Government from having the required
information to determine contractor efficiency? Analyzing the
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PROCAS indicates that DCMC's program will not induce an
efficient allocation of resources to a contractor's production
processes. There are two reasons for this conclusion. First,
contractors can increase shortrun profits by improving
technical efficiency to decrease production costs. However,
as the contractor reveals its costs, their future prices will
be adjusted. This reduces potential future profits. The
reduced profit for the contractor will deter them from long
term participation in the program. This explains why GSD may
be reluctant to provide DCMC with a return on investment.
Second, an efficient allocation will not occur because
contractors and the Government have different objectives. The
Government's objective in procurement is to minimize the cost
of a contract while maintaining the required end item's
quantity and quality. A contractor's objectives, on the other
hand, are profit motivated for its stockholders and employees
(job security). Because of the self-interest goals of defense
contractors, the Government will never have complete
information of a contractor's production process(es). This
lack of information will give rise to an asymmetric
environment.
This asymmetric information will cause a future challenge
for the Government. Contractors are different throughout the
defense industry and the challenge is to create an incentive
that is compatible/desired by most contractors. What
incentives can/should the Government use to encourage
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contractor efficiently? The next section will discuss this
issue.
D. EFFICIENCY THROUGH INCZNTIVE(S)
Contract structure is a key area to evaluate when
identifying effective incentives to promote efficiency. One
of the easiest ways to motivate a contractor is through
incentive type contracts. The two types of incentive
contracts that involve cost factors are:
1. Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee (CPIF). Used in advanced
engineering, systems development, and first production
contracts when uncertainties of performance preclude a
fixed-price contract but are not so great as to required
a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract. A target cost and a
target fee are established, together with minimum and
maximum fees. Cost overruns and underruns are shared in
accordance with a negotiated formula until the minimum
or maximum fee is reached. There is no ceiling price.
2. Fixed-Price-Incentive-Firm (FPIF). Used in much the
same way as CPIF, but where there is less uncertainty in
establishing a total ceiling price. The FPIF has the
same characteristics as a CPIF except that a ceiling
price is established and there are no minimum or maximum
fees. [Ref. 32:p. 5-29]
Why would Government buying offices prefer cost-reimbursement
or fixed-price incentive type contracts? Incentive type
contracts motivate the defense contractor to minimize costs
and share in the risk of unforeseen cost increases. As
discussed above, with an incentive contract, the Government
pays a predetermined percent of overruns if actual costs
exceed projected costs. The contractor is required to pay the
remaining portion of the overrun. Requiring the defense
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contractor to share in cost overruns encourages the contractor
to be more efficient. However, if the Government pays some of
the overrun, it will not necessarily make the contractor
maximize efficiency.
E. THE BEST STRATEGY FOR EFFICIENCY
The best strategy in creating contractor efficiency is for
the competitive market to maximize economic efficiency. To
maximize economic efficiency, the competitive market must have
three essential characteristics: [Ref. 33:p. 6]
1. There are many firms competing.
2. That no individual firm can affect the market price by
increasing or decreasing its output.
3. Firms retain 100% of their profit.
The most important characteristic is that firms retain 100V of
their profit. Retaining profit provides the defense
contractor the motivation to change production process(es),
thereby becoming more technically efficient. This technical
efficiency involves minimizing production costs. As more
defense contractors compete, the successful contractors will
be those who can produce at the least cost with the highest
quality. Therefore, in a competitive market, PROCAS is not
required to promote efficiency.
However with the declining defense budget, the competitive
market may be reduced to a sole source situation. Without
competition, there is no external motivation for a defense
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contractor to minimize production costs. In this environment,
implementing the PROCAS Program would enable the Government an
opportunity to team with the contractor on processes to
minimize production costs.
F. SMA(ARY
This chapter has described PROCAS's objective: enable the
Government and the contractor to identify key contractor
processes to improve the efficiency of performance on contract
requirements. DCMC's goal of improved contract efficiency is
admirable. Unfortunately, PROCAS is unlikely to succeed
because the Government and defense contractors have
conflicting objectives. These conflicting objectives will
lead to an asymmetric situation there-by creating an
implementation problem. PROCAS is likely to have a limited
impact on contractor efficiency. To improve contractor
efficiency, the Government would have to increase its use of
incentive type contracts. Unfortunately, Government cost
sharing in incentive contracts reduces a contractor's
incentive to be efficient.
The best approach to maximize efficiency is through the
competitive market system. In a competitive market system,
contractors make autonomous decentralized decisions in
establishing process improvements and informational
efficiency. Market price is not affected by the actions of a
single contractor. Therefore, contractors have an incentive
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to improve their processes. By defense contractors seeking to
maximize their own profits, they minimize production costs and
promote a more efficient allocation of resources. However, in
the sole source environment, PROCAS could be a valuable asset.
PROCAS could provide an external motivation for a contractor
to minimize production costs.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The Defense Contract Management Command's PROCAS Program
at GSD and the DPRO appears to be an effective method for
identifying critical processes. However, the strongest impact
of PROCAS is the overwhelming commitment of GSD and the DPRO
to the program. PROCAS has provided the foundation for
improving processes but more importantly it has reduced
program risk.
The PROCAS Program has not only heightened process
awareness but it has also improved relations between GSD and
the DPRO. In addition to the teaming success at GSL, other
major defense contractors including TRW, Magnavox, Martin
Marietta, Northrop, ana Hughes have reported similar success.
As a result of these successes, other defense companies are
anxious to implement the proqram. Government proponents are
pleased thus far with industry's support, as reflected in the
following quotes from Navy Rear Admiral Leonard Vincent,
Commander of the Defense Contract Management Command and
Colonel J. Wayne Shattuck, Urited States Air Force, DPRO
Commander at Northrop:
PROCAS is our prime mover, the initiative with the
greatest potential to move indostry and DCMC through the
90s as a team, with concrete benefits to both.
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PROCAS promotes a more objective, less adversarial
relationship between government and industry. The
measurement clears up communication problems. [Ref. 2 1:p.
10]
As a process improvement program, PROCAS provides a
tremendous opportunity to enhance a defense contractor's
performance, and reduce and improve Government oversight by
shifting focus from mature to newly identified processes. In
this current environment of intense congressional oversight,
combined with budgetary constraints, a positive defense
industry image could help maintain funding in important
programs (i.e., shipping and aircraft) thereby protecting
specific defense capabilities.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Both FMC and the DPRO have gained from an atmosphere of
increased communication at GSD in San Jose, California.
Currently, the monetary benefits compared to invested costs
are unknown. However, it is clear that the benefits of the
PROCAS Program to the Government and GSD will continue as long
as their commitment to quality, reduced process cost, and
schedule are maintained. Therefore, the DPRO should continue
to actively support and promote PROCAS at GSD.
GSD is the sole source contractor on many major programs.
This research has shown that Government teaming with a sole
source contractor will improve efficiency. However, if
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adequate competition exists, the Government should allow
market forces to establish contractor efficiency.
DCMC should continue to educate defense contractors and
Government personnel within its command of PROCAS's benefits.
Awareness through continuous training will establish the
values required for PROCAS success.
DCMC should establish a recognition program for those
DPROs and DCMAOs who successfully team with contractors.
Success recognition can be measured from a return on
investment perspective or simply recognizing a contractor and
a DPRO/DCMAO Commander working together to improve the quality
of the product for their customer.
C. ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
To what extent is DCMC's PROCAS Program reducing
Government oversight and increasing Government/contractor
communications?
At FMC in San Jose, GSD and DPRJ officials have together
identified critical processes in key systems within GSD. This
joint teaming has enabled the DPRO to more effectively
allocate resources to other critical areas of a contract.
Currently, the DPRO's general oversight has not been reduced
but merely shifted to other key processes. However, as more
critical processes become stable (mature), the DPRO will be
able to significantly reduce oversight throughout GSD.
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The relationship between the Government and GSD has
improved significantly and again teaming is the reason for
this success. Teaming has enabled GSD and the DPRO to work
out problems through scheduled and impromptu meetings where
the focus is on objective data and not subjectivity. By
staying away from subjectivity, the adversarial relationship
between GSD and the DPRO has been considerably reduced.
What are the essential elements of the PROCAS Program and
how has the program been implemented at GSD?
The PROCAS Program is part of DCMC's philosophy to improve
quality through continuous process improvement(s). An eight
step process for PROCAS has been identified: Government
planning, teaming agreement, team planning, process selection,
understanding the process, selecting the appropriate metrics,
measuring/analyzing/managing information, and adjusting
management emphasis. The PROCAS Program at GSD was easily
implemented. This accomplishment is attributed to GSD's TQM
philosophy. TQM is consistent and compatible with PROCAS.
Together with the cognizant DPRO, GSD is pursuing the
principles of PROCAS by establishing PBM Matrix:Stages 1 and
2. Future PBM Matrix Stages will be developed as current
stages demonstrate to GSD and the Government that the
processes are mature.
To what extent has the PROCAS Program changed the
processes at GSD?
79
There are three areas in which PROCAS changed the
processes at GSD. First, PROCAS focused on those processes of
greatest concern to GSD and to the DPRO. Secondly, this focus
moved process oversight from the traditional approach of
detection and correction to one of prevention and continuous
improvement. Finally, PROCAS enabled GSD and the DPRO to use
objective data to measure, analyze and manage critical
processes.
To what extent has the PROCAS Program changed the way the
cognizant DPRO reviews GSD's processes?
The PROCAS Program has created a cooperative environment
in which the DPRO and GSD jointly evaluate problem areas
within critical processes, resulting in a mutually beneficial
solution. However, this mutual solution does not eliminate
the DPRO's requirements of a contract nor does it imply the
DPRO can stray from the requirements outlined in the FAR or
the Department of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement (DFARS).
Is measuring the return on investment of PROCAS
beneficial?
Measuring the return on investment of PROCAS will not be
beneficial to the Government. If defense contractors are
required to submit a return on investment, they may manipulate
process resource allocations. Rearranging resources allows
defense contractors the flexibility to implement process
changes without incurring actual process improvements.
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Invoking flexibility is the defense contractor's way of self-
preservation because industry may feel, as they reveal costs,
future contract prices will be affected. This would reduce
potential profits. The possibility of reduced profit will
deter the defense industry from participating in the program.
The Government will see increased benefits of PROCAS if the
program is promoted as working together in a teaming approach
versus a relationship mandating a return on investment.
Mandating a return on investment only perpetuates an
adversarial relationship between Government and the defense
industry.
What conclusions may be drawn from GSD's implementation of
the PROCAS Program that could benefit Department of Defense
Contractors?
The PROCAS Program created a new atmosphere of open
communication and cooperation. This working relationship
enabled both GSD and the Government to work more effectively
and efficiently there-by improving total quality and lowering
life cycle costs.
From the GSD and Government experience, PROCAS can benefit
Department of Defense contractors by allowing them to work
with the Government to become not only more process efficient,
but to improve the quality of their product(s). Producing
high quality products at low cost will be the defense
industry's tangible assets if the defense downsizing forces
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them to compete in the commercial market. Hopefully, PROCAS
can prepare defense contractors for DOD's eventual downsizing.
D. AREAS OF FU'RTHR RESEARCH
The PROCAS Program at GSD has provided significant
benefits to the Government. Increased knowledge in GSD's
various systems has enabled the DPRO to focus on critical
processes and assign personnel more effectively. However, the
monetary benefits of improved processes is unknown. At the
time of this research, the DPRO's financial analyst is
attempting to quantify cost savings attributable to PROCAS.
As more cost data becomes available, additional research on
the return on investment of participating contractors would be
useful in determining the monetary effectiveness of the
program.
The European Community trade agreement has resulted in an
International Quality Standard referred to as ISO 9000. This
international standard demands that a company commit to and
define a quality system. To maintain a competitive position,
more and more American companies are looking towards ISO 9000
as a way of lowering costs while improving their quality.
[Ref. 34:p. 6] As more companies become involved in ISO 9000,
additional research comparing ISO 9000 and PROCAS would be
beneficial to determine if quality standards can be attained
without Government oversight.
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APPENDIX A. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ACO Administrative Contracting Officer
AGS Armored Gun System
BFV Bradley Fighting Vehicle
CAO Contract Administration office
CAR Corrective Action Report
CAS Contract Administrative Services
CIO Continuous Improvement Opportunity
CPIF Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee
CPSR Contractor Purchasing System Review
CRAG Contractor Risk Assessment Guide
DCAA Defense Contract Audit Agency
DCAS Defense Contract Administrative Services
DCMAO Defense Contract Management Area Operations
DCMC Defense Contract Management Command
DCMD Defense Contract Management District
DFARS Department of Defense FAR Supplement
DLA Defense Logistics Agency
DMR Defense Management Report
DOD Department of Defense
DODIG Department of Defense Inspector General
DPRO Defense Plant Representative Office
ECP Engineering Change Proposal




GAO General Accounting Office
GSD Ground Systems Division
IQUE In-Plant Quality Evaluation
ISO 9000 International Quality Standard
MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System
NCMA National Contract Management Association
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
PAT Project Action Team
PBM Performance Based Management
PROCAS Process Oriented Contract Administration
Services
SECDEF Secretary of Defense
TQM Total Quality Management
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